 Competition for environmental aid and aid fungibilityCostas Hadjiyiannis (), Panos Hatzipanayotou and Michael Michael Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2013, vol. 65, issue 1, 1-11 Abstract: Aid from environmentally conscious donors to developing recipients has long been thought of as a very promising way of preserving the global environment. However, aid is fungible and recipients cannot commit to using it for the purpose it was intended. We analyze competition for aid games with aid fungibility and cross-border pollution to gain insights on how to allocate environmental aid more efficiently. We set up a two stage game of two recipients receiving aid from a donor interested in minimizing pollution. Recipients cannot commit on the use of aid but they can commit on the infrastructure necessary to use aid for pollution abatement. We find that the success of competition for aid games depends critically on the degree of cross-border pollution. This determines whether it is more efficient to set up such games between recipients with little (or a lot of) cross-border pollution between them. Keywords: Competition for aid; Aid fungibility; Environmental policies (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:65:y:2013:i:1:p:1-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.04.004 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Environmental Economics and Management is currently edited by M.A. Cole, A. Lange, D.J. Phaneuf, D. Popp, M.J. Roberts, M.D. Smith, C. Timmins, Q. Weninger and A.J. Yates More articles in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.