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Incentives, green preferences, and private provision of impure public goods

Casey Wichman

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2016, vol. 79, issue C, 208-220

Abstract: Pro-environmental preferences are being used increasingly in environmental policy. In this paper, I consider the role of heterogeneous green preferences for private provision of environmental goods that have both private and public characteristics. Under different assumptions of information available to a regulator, I characterize equilibrium properties of several mechanisms. I find incentive-compatible Nash equilibria that provide socially optimal public goods provision when the regulator can enforce individual consumption contracts, as well as when reported consumption contracts are supplemented with group penalties. Throughout the paper, I ground the exposition with examples of consumer behavior in the context of green electricity programs and goal setting for energy conservation.

Keywords: Private provision of public goods; Impure public goods; Green markets; Incentives; Preference revelation; Environmental regulation; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H41 L51 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:79:y:2016:i:c:p:208-220

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.06.003

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Journal of Environmental Economics and Management is currently edited by M.A. Cole, A. Lange, D.J. Phaneuf, D. Popp, M.J. Roberts, M.D. Smith, C. Timmins, Q. Weninger and A.J. Yates

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