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Carbon is forever: A climate change experiment on cooperation

Giacomo Calzolari (), Marco Casari and Riccardo Ghidoni ()

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2018, vol. 92, issue C, 169-184

Abstract: Greenhouse gases generate impacts that can last longer than human civilization itself. Such persistence may affect the behavioral ability to cooperate. In a laboratory experiment, we study mitigation efforts with dynamic externalities in a framework that reflects key features of climate change. In treatments with persistence, pollution cumulates and generates damages over time, while in another treatment it has only immediate effects and then disappears. We show that with pollution persistence, cooperation is initially high but then systematically deteriorates with high stocks of pollution.

Keywords: Stock externalities; Public goods; Inequality; Dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D03 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Carbon is Forever: a Climate Change Experiment on Cooperation (2016) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.09.002

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Journal of Environmental Economics and Management is currently edited by M.A. Cole, A. Lange, D.J. Phaneuf, D. Popp, M.J. Roberts, M.D. Smith, C. Timmins, Q. Weninger and A.J. Yates

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