Bargaining over natural resources: Governments between environmental organizations and extraction firms

Mark Schopf and Achim Voß

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2019, vol. 97, issue C, 208-240

Abstract: We consider the resource-extraction policy of a government that is lobbied by an environmental organization and an extraction firm from foreign countries. To analyze this situation, we propose a sequential Nash bargaining solution: The government bargains with both lobbies simultaneously. Should this trilateral negotiation fail, it chooses one lobby for a bilateral negotiation. The disagreement point then is to bargain with the other lobby. Finally, should this second bilateral negotiation break down, the government chooses the welfare-maximizing policy.

Keywords: Nash bargaining; Dynamic bargaining; Lobbying; International political economy; Environmental policy; Exhaustible-resource extraction; Stock-pollution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C71 D72 Q38 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Bargaining over Natural Resources: Governments between Environmental Organizations and Extraction Firms (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:97:y:2019:i:c:p:208-240

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.12.002

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