The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 132, issue 1, 461-473

Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (2007)
Working Paper: The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (2004)
Working Paper: The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:461-473

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