The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public†information. The results generalize to the n -person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties†to effectively enforce contracts.

Date: 2007
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games (2007)
Working Paper: The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (2004)
Working Paper: The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3203772

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