The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Chapter 15 in A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games, 2008, pp 331-343 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractWe show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the n-person case. However. the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players. and using these “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts.

Keywords: Long-Run Players; Limit Games; Robustness; Equilibrium; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games (2007)
Working Paper: The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (2007)
Working Paper: The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (2004)
Working Paper: The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games (2002)
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