A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games
Edited by Drew Fudenberg and
David Levine ()
in World Scientific Books from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Keywords: Long-Run Players; Limit Games; Robustness; Equilibrium; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:wsbook:6880
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