Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Chapter 8 in A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games, 2008, pp 143-161 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThis paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. We obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to 1, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy.

Keywords: Long-Run Players; Limit Games; Robustness; Equilibrium; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (1999)
Journal Article: Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (1992)
Working Paper: Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (1991)
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