Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

The Review of Economic Studies, 1992, vol. 59, issue 3, 561-579

Abstract: This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. We obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to 1, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy.

Date: 1992
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Related works:
Working Paper: Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (1999)
Working Paper: Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (1991)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:3:p:561-579.

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