Limit Games and Limit Equilibria

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Chapter 2 in A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games, 2008, pp 21-39 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractWe provide a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibria of a game to arise as limits of ε-equilibria of games with smaller strategy spaces. As the smaller games are frequently more tractable, our result facilitates the characterization of the set of equilibria.

Keywords: Long-Run Players; Limit Games; Robustness; Equilibrium; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789812818478_0002 (application/pdf)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/9789812818478_0002 (text/html)
Ebook Access is available upon purchase.

Related works:
Journal Article: Limit games and limit equilibria (1986)
Working Paper: Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (1986)
Working Paper: Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (1986)
Working Paper: Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (1983)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0002

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in World Scientific Book Chapters from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().