When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?

Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
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Wolfgang Pesendorfer: Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544-5264, USA

Chapter 6 in A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games, 2008, pp 95-120 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractWe examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the game where there is a continuum of small players. This paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players' actions are “anonymous.” That is, we allow each small player's actions to be observed separately, instead of supposing that the small players' actions are only observed through their effect on an aggregate statistic.

Keywords: Long-Run Players; Limit Games; Robustness; Equilibrium; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Journal Article: When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (1998)
Working Paper: When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (1998)
Working Paper: When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible (1996)
Working Paper: When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible? (1995)
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