An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Chapter 14 in A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games, 2008, pp 309-330 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThis paper studies repeated games in which players are imperfectly informed about the uncertain consequences of their opponents stage game actions. We show that if the game is informationally connected, the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs includes the enforceable mutually punishable set, if the intertemporal criterion is (i) the lim inf time average, or (ii) the limit of ε-equilibria with discount factor δ, and ε → 0 as δ → 1. We also explore the link between these two criterion functions.

Keywords: Long-Run Players; Limit Games; Robustness; Equilibrium; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Journal Article: An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information (1991)
Working Paper: An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information (1991)
Working Paper: AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION (1989)
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