Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Chapter 3 in A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games, 2008, pp 41-58 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractIf players are small, one might expect that optimal reactions to one-player deviations are negligible, so that the open- and closed-loop equilibria are approximately the same. We investigate the circumstances in which this is true.

Keywords: Long-Run Players; Limit Games; Robustness; Equilibrium; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Journal Article: Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players (1988)
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