Long persuasion games

Francoise Forges and Frederic Koessler

Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 143, issue 1, 1-35

Abstract: This paper characterizes geometrically the sets of all Nash and perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart [R.J. Aumann, S. Hart, Long cheap talk, Econometrica 71 (6) (2003) 1619-1660], we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.

Keywords: Belief; consistency; Cheap; talk; Diconvexification; Dimartingale; Disclosure; of; certifiable; information; Jointly; controlled; lotteries; Long; conversation; Persuasion; Sequential; rationality; Verifiable; types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Long persuasion games (2008)
Working Paper: Long persuasion games (2008)
Working Paper: Long Persuasion Games (2006)
Working Paper: Long Persuasion Games (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:1-35

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