Long Persuasion Games

Francoise Forges and Frederic Koessler

No 1669, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart (2003), we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.

Keywords: cheap talk; communication; diconvexification; dimartingale; disclosure of certifiable information; jointly controlled lotteries; long conversation; persuasion; verifiable types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Long persuasion games (2008)
Working Paper: Long persuasion games (2008)
Working Paper: Long persuasion games (2008)
Working Paper: Long Persuasion Games (2006)
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