Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects

Francois Maniquet

Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 143, issue 1, 199-215

Abstract: In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.

Keywords: Indivisible; good; Social; ordering; function; Leximin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects (2009)
Working Paper: Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:199-215

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