Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects

Francois Maniquet

No 15, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Abstract: In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.

Keywords: Indivisible Good; Social Ordering Function; Leximin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2002-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/econpaperfifteen.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/econpaperfifteen.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/econpaperfifteen.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.ias.edu/sss/publications/papers/econpaperfifteen.pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects (2009)
Journal Article: Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ads:wpaper:0015

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nancy Cotterman ().