Economics at your fingertips  

Size approval voting

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu () and Marc Vorsatz

Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 144, issue 3, 1187-1210

Abstract: We propose a new class of voting procedures, called Size Approval Voting, according to which, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other candidates that individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved candidates. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all candidates with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting procedures is characterized by a set of natural properties.

Keywords: Approval; voting; Characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Size Approval Voting (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Size approval voting (2007) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2024-05-10
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:3:p:1187-1210