Size Approval Voting

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu () and Marc Vorsatz

Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra from Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra

Abstract: We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the efective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other alternatives the very same individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved alternatives. Then, for a given pro¯le of individual votes, all those alternatives with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting is characterized by a set of natural properties.

Keywords: Approval Voting; Characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Size approval voting (2009)
Working Paper: Size approval voting (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nav:ecupna:0703

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