Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?

Salvador Barberà (), Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 145, issue 5, 1648-1674

Abstract: A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Group; strategy-proofness; Sequential; inclusion; Single-peaked; preferences; Separable; preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (89)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide? (2015)
Working Paper: Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:5:p:1648-1674

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