Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

Salvador Barberà (), Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Group strategy-proofness; k-size strategy-proofness; Sequential inclusion; Single-peaked preferences; Single-dipped preferences; Separable preferences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2009-02-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide? (2015)
Journal Article: Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:761.09

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