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On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules

Johanna Goertz () and Francois Maniquet ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 4, 1464-1480

Abstract: We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5], [6] and [7]). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational efficiency that requires a voting rule to have at least one efficient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisfies this criterion.

Keywords: Efficient; information; aggregation; Scoring; rules; Poisson; games; Approval; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Working Paper: On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules Downloads
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