On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
Johanna Goertz () and
Francois Maniquet ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 4, 1464-1480
We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer ,  and ). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational efficiency that requires a voting rule to have at least one efficient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisfies this criterion.
Keywords: Efficient; information; aggregation; Scoring; rules; Poisson; games; Approval; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules (2009)
Working Paper: On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:4:p:1464-1480
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