On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules

Johanna Goertz () and Francois Maniquet

No 2009026, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Keywords: efficient information aggregation; scoring rules; Poisson games; approval voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2009.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules (2011)
Working Paper: On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2009026

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().