Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core

Akira Okada

Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 3, 1165-1190

Abstract: In an exchange economy with incomplete information, the signaling core is defined by the set of state-contingent allocations to which no coalitions object under informational leakage through proposals by informed agents. An objection underlying the signaling core is supported by a sequential equilibrium of an ultimatum bargaining game with an informed proposer. We prove that a stationary sequential equilibrium allocation in a Rubinstein-type sequential bargaining game with a restart rule belongs to the signaling core if the belief of players satisfies a self-selection property.

Keywords: Core; Exchange economy; Incomplete information; Information transmission; Non-cooperative bargaining; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core (2009)
Working Paper: Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:3:p:1165-1190

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.009

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