Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core
No 2009-03, Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
We consider information transmission in the core of an exchange economy with incomplete information by non-cooperative bargaining theory. Reformulating the coalitional voting game by Serrano and Vohra [Information transmission in coalitional voting games, J. of Economic Theory (2007), 117-137] so that an informed agent proposes an allocation, we define a notion of the informational core. A coalition has an informational objection to the status-quo allocation if and only if there exists an equilibrium rejection in the coalitional voting game. We present a non-cooperative sequential bargaining game in which coalitional voting games are repeated, and prove that a refinement of a sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game necessarily yields an allocation in the informational core.
Keywords: core; exchange economy; incomplete information; information transmission; non-cooperative bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core (2012)
Working Paper: Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:econdp:2009-03
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