Probabilistic assignment of objects: Characterizing the serial rule

Anna Bogomolnaia and Eun Jeong Heo

Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 5, 2072-2082

Abstract: We study the problem of assigning a set of objects to a set of agents, when each agent receives one object and has strict preferences over the objects. In the absence of monetary transfers, we focus on the probabilistic rules, which take the ordinal preferences as input. We characterize the serial rule, proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) [2]: it is the only rule satisfying sd efficiency, sd no-envy, and bounded invariance. A special representation of feasible assignment matrices by means of consumption processes is the key to the simple and intuitive proof of our main result.

Keywords: Probabilistic assignment; Serial rule; Sd efficiency; Sd no-envy; Bounded invariance; Consumption process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:5:p:2072-2082

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.013

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