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Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits

Vijay Krishna and John Morgan

Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 6, 2083-2123

Abstract: We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participation rates are such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected—that is, information fully aggregates. Because it economizes on costs, voluntary voting is again welfare superior to compulsory voting.

Keywords: Costly voting; Condorcet Jury Theorem; Information aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:6:p:2083-2123

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.006

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