Equivalence of the information structure with unawareness to the logic of awareness

Sander Heinsalu

Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 6, 2453-2468

Abstract: This paper proves the Li (2009) [13] unawareness structure equivalent to the single-agent propositionally generated logic of awareness of Fagin and Halpern (1988) [4]. For any model of one type one can construct a model of the other type describing the same belief and awareness. Li starts from an agent unable to perceive aspects of the world and distinguish states, modeled with subjective state spaces coarser than the objective state space. Fagin and Halpern limit the agentʼs language or cognitive ability to reasoning only about a subset of the primitive propositions describing the world. Equivalence of these approaches suggests they capture a natural notion of unawareness in a minimal way.

Keywords: Unawareness; Awareness; State space models; Modal logic; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:6:p:2453-2468

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.010

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