Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms

Yves Sprumont ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 3, 1102-1121

Abstract: A single valuable object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Monetary transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter infinite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family.

Keywords: Assignment; Strategy-proof mechanisms; Groves mechanisms; Constrained optimality; No envy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms (2011)
Working Paper: Constrained-Optimal Strategy-Proof Assignment: Beyond the Groves Mechanisms (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:3:p:1102-1121

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.015

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