Constrained-Optimal Strategy-Proof Assignment: Beyond the Groves Mechanisms

Yves Sprumont ()

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We o¤er an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto- optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter in nite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family.

Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2011
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Journal Article: Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms (2013)
Working Paper: Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:14-2011

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