On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 154, issue C, 187-215

Abstract: We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Second, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Keywords: Assignment game; Core; Set-wise stability; Competitive equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053114001379
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria (2015)
Working Paper: On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:187-215

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.016

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().