On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria

Alejandro Neme (aneme@unsl.edu.ar)
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 438, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Keywords: assignment game; core; Competitive Equilibrium; Set-wise stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria (2014)
Working Paper: On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria (2010)
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