On the persistence of strategic sophistication

Sotiris Georganas, Paul Healy () and Roberto Weber

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 159, issue PA, 369-400

Abstract: We examine whether the “Level-k” model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions at the individual level. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of games does not predict their ranking in the other. Direct tests of strategic reasoning generally do not predict estimated levels. Within families of games, we find that levels are fairly consistent within one family, but not the other. Our results suggest that the use of Level-k reasoning varies by game, making prediction difficult.

Keywords: Level-k; Cognitive hierarchy; Behavioral game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (105)

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Working Paper: On the Persistence of Strategic Sophistication (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:369-400

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.012

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