A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types

Akira Okada

Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 163, issue C, 318-341

Abstract: We consider a non-cooperative sequential bargaining game with incomplete information where two players negotiate for mechanisms with ex post verifiable types at the interim stage. We prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game where the ex post Nash bargaining solution with no delay is asymptotically implemented with probability one. Further, the ex post Nash bargaining solution is a unique outcome of a stationary equilibrium under the property of Independence of Irrelevant Types (IIT), whereby the response of every type of a player is independent of allocations proposed to his other types, and under a self-selection property of their belief.

Keywords: Bayesian bargaining problem; Incomplete information; Mechanism selection; Ex post Nash bargaining solution; Non-cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:163:y:2016:i:c:p:318-341

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.002

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