A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types

Akira Okada and 章 岡田

No 2013-15, Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

Keywords: bargaining; incomplete information; mechanism selection; ex post Nash bargaining solution; non-cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/26008/070econDP13-15.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:econdp:2013-15

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library ().