How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?

Johannes Hörner and Satoru Takahashi

Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 165, issue C, 332-359

Abstract: We provide tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the equilibrium payoff sets for repeated games under both perfect and imperfect public monitoring. The distance between the equilibrium payoff set and its limit vanishes at rate (1−δ)1/2 under perfect monitoring, and at rate (1−δ)1/4 under imperfect monitoring. For strictly individually rational payoff vectors, these rates improve to 0 (i.e., all strictly individually rational payoff vectors are exactly achieved as equilibrium payoffs for δ high enough) and (1−δ)1/2, respectively.

Keywords: Repeated games; Rates of convergence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053116300345
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? (2017)
Working Paper: How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games" (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:165:y:2016:i:c:p:332-359

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.05.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().