How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games"

Johannes Hörner and Satoru Takahashi

No 2029, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We provide tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the equilibrium payoff sets for repeated games under both perfect and imperfect public monitoring. The distance between the equilibrium payoff set and its limit vanishes at rate (1 - delta)^{1/2} under perfect monitoring, and at rate (1 - delta)^{1/4} under imperfect monitoring. For strictly individually rational payoff vectors, these rates improve to 0 (i.e., all strictly individually rational payoff vectors are exactly achieved as equilibrium payoffs for delta high enough) and (1 - delta)^{1/2}, respectively.

Keywords: Repeated games; Rates of convergence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2029.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Working Paper: How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? (2017)
Journal Article: How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2029

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().