The market for conservation and other hostages

Bard Harstad

Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 166, issue C, 124-151

Abstract: A “conservation good” (such as a tropical forest) is owned by a seller who is tempted to consume (or cut), but a buyer benefits more from conservation. The seller prefers to conserve if the buyer is expected to buy, but the buyer is unwilling to pay as long as the seller conserves. This contradiction implies that the market for conservation cannot be efficient and conservation is likely to fail. A leasing market is inefficient for similar reasons and dominates the sales market if and only if the consumption value and the buyer's protection cost are large. The theory thus explains why optimal conservation often fails and why conservation abroad is leased, while domestic conservation is bought.

Keywords: Conservation; Dynamic games; Sales v rental markets; Deforestation; Market failure; Time inconsistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D78 H87 Q23 Q30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages (2013)
Working Paper: The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:166:y:2016:i:c:p:124-151

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.003

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