The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages

Bard Harstad

No 4296, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: A “conservation good” (such as a tropical forest) is owned by a seller who is tempted to consume (or cut), but a buyer benefits more from conservation. The seller does conserve if the buyer is expected to buy, but the buyer is unwilling to pay as long as the seller conserves. This contradiction implies that the market for conservation cannot be efficient and conservation is likely to fail. A leasing market is inefficient for similar reasons and dominates the sales market if and only if the conservation value is low, the consumption value high, and the buyer’s protection cost large. The theory explains why optimal conservation often fails and why conservation abroad is leased, while domestic conservation is bought.

Keywords: conservation; deforestation; dynamic games; sales v rental markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D78 H87 Q23 Q30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The market for conservation and other hostages (2016)
Working Paper: The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4296

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