Approval voting and scoring rules with common values

David S. Ahn and Santiago Oliveros

Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 166, issue C, 304-310

Abstract: We compare approval voting with other scoring rules for environments with common values and private information. For finite electorates, the best equilibrium under approval voting is superior to plurality rule or negative voting. For large electorates, if any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that efficiently aggregates information, then approval voting must do so as well.

Keywords: Approval voting; Scoring rule; Plurality rule; Information aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:166:y:2016:i:c:p:304-310

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.002

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