Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values

Ds Ahn and Santiago Oliveros

Economics Discussion Papers from University of Essex, Department of Economics

Abstract: Consider the problem of deciding a winner among three alternatives when voters have common values, but private information regarding the values of the alternatives. We compare approval voting with other scoring rules. For any finite electorate, the best equilibrium under approval voting is more efficient than either plurality rule or negative voting. If any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that aggregates information in large elections, then approval voting must do so as well.

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repository.essex.ac.uk/8983/ original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Approval voting and scoring rules with common values (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esx:essedp:8983

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Discussion Papers Administrator, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Discussion Papers from University of Essex, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Essex Economics Web Manager ().