# Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships

*Hajime Kobayashi*,
*Katsunori Ohta* () and
*Tadashi Sekiguchi*

*Journal of Economic Theory*, 2016, vol. 166, issue C, 311-323

**Abstract:**
This paper extends a model of repeated partnerships by Radner et al. (1986) allowing heterogeneous partners to choose their sharing rule. A sharing rule is optimal if the repeated game under the sharing rule has a public strategy equilibrium whose payoff sum is not improved by any public strategy equilibrium under any sharing rule. Two key factors for the analysis are the efficiency loss from allowing only the more productive partner to work and the efficiency loss in any cooperative equilibrium from imperfect observability. If the latter loss is smaller than the former, a threshold discount factor exists below which an asymmetric sharing rule inducing only one partner to work every period is optimal. At the threshold, an optimal sharing rule uniquely exists that is also optimal for any greater discount factor. The latter sharing rule reduces to the equal sharing rule for identical partners. The optimal equilibrium payoff sum as a function of the discount factor is a step function whose jump occurs at the threshold discount factor.

**Keywords:** Partnerships; Repeated games; Imperfect public monitoring; Sharing rule; Optimal equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)

**JEL-codes:** C72 C73 L23 P13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

**Date:** 2016

**References:** View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc

**Citations:** View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

**Downloads:** (external link)

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053116300783

Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

**Related works:**

Working Paper: Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships (2008)

This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

**Export reference:** BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text

**Persistent link:** https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:166:y:2016:i:c:p:311-323

**DOI:** 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.004

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by *A. Lizzeri* and *K. Shell*

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier

Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().