Details about Tadashi Sekiguchi

Access statistics for papers by Tadashi Sekiguchi.

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Short-id: pse710

Working Papers

2016

1. Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring
   Discussion Papers, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration
2. Repeated Games with Recursive Utility:Cournot Duopoly under Gain/Loss Asymmetry
   Discussion papers, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University View citations (1)

2013

3. MULTIMARKET CONTACT UNDER DEMAND FLUCTUATIONS: A LIMIT RESULT
   Working Papers, Tokyo Center for Economic Research View citations (1)

2008

4. Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships
   KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2016) View citations (2) (2016)

2007

5. The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs
   2007 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics
   Also in KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research (2004) View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2008) View citations (21) (2008)

2004

6. On the Negative Result in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
   KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research
7. Reputation and Turnover
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania View citations (1)
   Also in KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research (2004) View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article Reputation and turnover, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2006) View citations (7) (2006)

2003

8. Repeated Games with Observation Costs
   KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research View citations (4)

2001

9. Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
   Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department View citations (5)
   See also Journal Article Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter (2002) View citations (31) (2002)
10. Product Quality, Reputation and Turnover
    Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department View citations (2)

Undated

11. The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
    Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department
    See also Journal Article The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2002) View citations (18) (2002)

Journal Articles

2016

1. Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, 166, (C), 311-323 View citations (2)
   See also Working Paper Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships, KIER Working Papers (2008) View citations (3) (2008)

2015

2. Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations
   International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44, (4), 1033-1048 View citations (3)

2013

3. Finitely repeated games with monitoring options
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148, (5), 1929-1952 View citations (3)

2008

4. The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 139, (1), 192-221 View citations (21)
   See also Working Paper The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs, 2007 Meeting Papers (2007) (2007)

2006

5. Reputation and turnover
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37, (2), 341-361 View citations (7)
   See also Working Paper Reputation and Turnover, PIER Working Paper Archive (2004) View citations (1) (2004)

2005

6. UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING*
   The Japanese Economic Review, 2005, 56, (3), 317-331 View citations (2)

2002

7. Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (2), 299-321 View citations (4)
8. Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
   The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2002, 2, (1), 23 View citations (31)
   See also Working Paper Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring, Penn CARESS Working Papers (2001) View citations (5) (2001)
9. The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (1), 99-122 View citations (18)
   See also Working Paper The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Penn CARESS Working Papers

2001

10. A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring
    Economics Letters, 2001, 74, (1), 67-70 View citations (3)

1997

11. Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 76, (2), 345-361 View citations (99)