On the Negative Result in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Tadashi Sekiguchi

No 593, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper examines when a finitely repeated game with imperfect monitoring has a unique equilibrium outcome. This problem is nontrivial under imperfect monitoring, because uniqueness of stage game equilibrium does not guarantee such a negative result. We say an quilibrium is equilibrium minimaxing if any player's equilibrium payoff is her minimax value when the other players choose correlated actions from the support of the equilibrium. We show that the negative result holds if all stage game correlated equilibria are \eqmmin\ and have the same payoffs. We also argue that several weaker conditions do not imply the negative result.

Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2004-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kyo:wpaper:593

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