The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs

Yasuyuki Miyahara, Tadashi Sekiguchi and Eiichi Miyagawa
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Yasuyuki Miyahara: Kobe University

No 751, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: efficient cooperation in general repeated games.

Date: 2007
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Related works:
Journal Article: The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs (2008)
Working Paper: The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs (2004)
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