Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George Mailath, Steven Matthews () and Tadashi Sekiguchi

Penn CARESS Working Papers from Penn Economics Department

Date: 2001-10
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Journal Article: Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (2002)
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