 Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishabilityDirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 168, issue C, 329-371 Abstract: We study agents whose expected utility preferences are interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be “strategically distinguished” in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they have different hierarchies of interdependent preferences. The same characterization applies for rationalizability, equilibrium, and any interim solution concept in between. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992), who characterize strategic distinguishability on fixed finite type spaces, and Dekel et al. (2006, 2007), who characterize strategic distinguishability without interdependent preferences. Keywords: Interdependent preferences; Higher order preferences; Hierarchy of preferences; Strategic distinguishability (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:168:y:2017:i:c:p:329-371 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.002 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier |
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