Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi

No 1772, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional preferences; and so on. Two types are said to be strategically indistinguishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to alternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.

Keywords: Interdependent preferences; Higher-order preference hierarchy; Universal type space; Strategic distinguishability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability (2017)
Working Paper: Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (2016)
Working Paper: Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (2014)
Working Paper: Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (2011)
Working Paper: Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (2011)
Working Paper: Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (2011)
Working Paper: Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (2010)
Working Paper: Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (2010)
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