Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release

Nikolaus Schweizer and Nora Szech

Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 170, issue C, 86-111

Abstract: This paper studies information release in symmetric, independent private value auctions with multiple objects and unit demand. We compare effects on welfare to those on the seller's revenue. Applying the dispersive order, the previous literature could only identify settings in which welfare provides the stronger incentives for information release. We generalize the dispersive order to k- and k–m-dispersion. These new criteria allow us to systematically characterize situations in which revenue provides stronger incentives than welfare, and vice versa. k–m-dispersion leads to a complete classification if signal spaces are finite and sufficiently many bidders take part.

Keywords: Auctions; Information release; Order statistics; Stochastic orders; Dispersive order; Excess wealth order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release (2015)
Working Paper: Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release (2015)
Working Paper: Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release (2015)
Working Paper: Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:170:y:2017:i:c:p:86-111

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.005

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